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COMPARATIVE FEATURES AND PERFORMANCE OF
STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN
AMERICA*
Carmelo Mesa-Lagot
INTRODUCTION
From 1981 through 1998, the following eight Latin Ameri-
can countries enacted laws and implemented structural social
insurance pension reforms: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colom-
bia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. This Article ana-
lyzes those reforms in a comparative fashion, focusing on four
issues: (1) concepts, cases and importance; (2) general reform
models and their fundamental features; (3) financing and tran-
sitional costs; and (4) reform performance.
I. CONCEPTS, CASES AND IMPORTANCE
Structural reforms radically transform an existing social
insurance pension system ("public") by either substituting,
supplementing or providing an alternative mandatory "private"
system to it. Non-structural reforms try to improve or "perfect"
the public system in order to preserve and strengthen it with-
out changing its public nature. This article deals with structur-
al reforms only.
For simplicity purposes, pension systems are divided here-
in into two groups: (1) public and (2) private. These two terms,
nevertheless, are imprecise and ideologically loaded. In order
to develop a more neutral classification and explain the exact
nature of the two systems, Table 1 (segment A) exhibits their
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four major characteristics concerning: contributions, benefits,
financial method and administration.
A "public" system has defined benefits (pensions) as they
are regulated by law which also sets the formula to calculate
them (the benefit, however, may not be financially feasible and
could be eroded by inflation and other factors). The system
contribution is non-defined because it tends to increase in the
long run due to the maturation of the pension system and
demographic causes. The financial method is either partly
funded (i.e., it keeps the system in actuarial equilibrium for a
given period of time instead of indefinitely) or is pay-as-you-go
("PAYG") in which income is used to pay expenses on an annu-
al basis. Most Latin American countries rely on the former
method while the pioneering countries use the latter (in the
current international debate it is often incorrectly stated that
all public systems are on PAYG). Finally, the administration is
public, that is, carried out by the social insurance institution.
Conversely, a "private" system is based on a defined con-
tribution: fixed indefinitely and going into an individual ac-
count. It provides non-defined (uncertain) benefits because, at
the time of retirement, the insured receives whatever sum has
accumulated in his or her individual account. The financial
method is fully funded, and the administration is either by
private for-profit corporations of exclusive dedication or by
multiple institutions (e.g., public, social insurance, coopera-
tives, etc.).'
Table 2, column 2 illustrates the year that was pension
reform was implemented in the eight Latin American coun-
tries. Usually it took at least one year to elaborate the legal
draft of the reform and approve it, and four to seventeen
months from the time that the law was enacted until the sys-
tem became operational. There was a twelve-year gap between
the implementation of the pioneer structural pension reform in
Chile (1981) and the next reform that occurred in Peru (1993).
The main reason for this hiatus was political: the authoritari-
an nature of the Chilean regime made its pension reform un-
popular in the rest of the region. When democracy was rein-
1 For more elaboration on these issues see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Pension System
Reforms in Latin America: The Position of International Organizations, CEPAL
REv. 60, 73-98 (1996).
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stated in Chile in 1990, the new government basically ratified
the pension reform; it then became politically palatable in the
region, and seven reforms were implemented from 1993
through 1997.
Most of the remaining twelve Latin American countries
are either studying or elaborating their own pension reforms,
among them Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Pana-
ma and Venezuela. Thus, Latin America is important because
it experienced the first case of pension privatization (Chile),
and the region is fast becoming a testing ground for different
types of reforms. The regional experience shows, however, that
there is no one single model of reform; three general models of
reform will be identified below, and all eight Latin American
cases are proven different.
II. GENERAL MODELS AND FEATURES OF THE REFORM
The eight pension reforms can be clustered into three
general models: substitutive, mixed and parallel (see Table 1,
segment B). In the substitutive model, the old public pension
system is closed (new affiliations are not allowed) and replaced
by a new private system. Chile is the pioneer and prototype of
this model, which is largely followed by Bolivia, El Salvador
and Mexico. The first two countries basically share all the
Chilean features, but Mexico is different; its administration is
multiple, and those insured at the time of the reform can
choose at retirement between the amount accumulated in the
individual account or a defined benefit according to the rules of
the old public system. In all four countries new entrants into
the labor force must join the new system, but those insured in
the old system faced the following divergent alternatives: in
Chile they obtained a period of time to decide between staying
and moving to the new system; in El Salvador only an interme-
diate group, in terms of age, had such an option (old insured
had to stay in the public system while the young had to move
to the new); and in Bolivia and Mexico all the insured workers
in the old system had to move to the new.
In the mixed model, the public system is not closed but
reformed, and it becomes one of the two integrated components
of the new system: the public component pays a basic pension,
while a new component finances a supplementary pension.
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Argentina and Uruguay have applied this model and, in both,
the public component has non-defined contribution, defined
benefit, is financed by PAYG and publicly administered. The
supplementary component incorporates three of the features of
the prototype private system (defined contribution, non-defined
benefit and fully-funded), but its administration is multiple. In
Argentina new entrants into the labor force can choose to join
the reformed public system or the mixed one, while in Uruguay
they must join the mixed system. Those insured at the time of
the reform in Argentina have the same option as entrants in
the labor force, while in Uruguay they are divided according to
age and wage-young insured with relatively high salaries may
stay or move, while old and low-salary insured must stay.
In the parallel model, the old public system is not closed
but becomes an alternative option to a private system. Colom-
bia and Peru follow this model but with important differences
among them. In Colombia the public system was thoroughly
reformed to strengthen it, and is partially funded, while the
private system has multiple types of administrators. Converse-
ly, in Peru the public system was not initially but later re-
formed, albeit partially and in piecemeal fashion, and it is
based on PAYG, while the private system meets all the four
features of the Chilean prototype. Both old insured and new
entrants into the labor force can select any of the two systems
and move among them.2
The three models and eight cases briefly described above
exhibit important differences concerning three freedoms of
choice: (a) to select the system; (b) to choose administrators;
and (c) to determine how the pension is paid.On the freedom to select between the public and private or
mixed systems, the countries may be ordered as follow: (i)
maximum freedom exists in Argentina, Colombia and Peru
(because both old insured and new entrants in the labor force
can select and move among systems); (ii) intermediate freedom
in Chile (new entrants in the labor force must join the private
system, but the old insured had a period to stay or move) and
El Salvador and Uruguay (new entrants in the labor force
must enter private and mixed system respectively, and the old
insured are divided by age, and only some of them have an
2 See id.
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option); and (iii) minimum freedom in Bolivia and Mexico (both
old insured and new entrants in the labor force must enter the
new system).
Addressing the liberty to select administrators, in Argenti-
na, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay, there are multiple admin-
istrators, while in Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador and Peru, only
private for-profit corporations of exclusive dedication are al-
lowed. Restrictions to change administrators (see last column
of Table 2) are not legally existent in Chile and Peru (but one
year is required in practice due to bureaucratic procedures);
two changes per year are permitted in Argentina, Colombia,
Uruguay and El Salvador, and one change per year in Mexico.
Changes are prohibited in Bolivia until the year 2000.
Finally, at the time of retirement, no country allows a
lump-sum payment of the fund accumulated in the individual
account. Usually three options are open to the insured: an
annuity paid by a commercial insurance company, a pro-
grammed pension paid by the administrator of the pension
fund, or a combination of both. In Bolivia only an annuity is
available (fixed or variable, paid by an insurance company or
administrator of a pension fund), while the combination of the
two is not possible in Mexico. The insured in the latter actually
has the greatest freedom as he or she can select either a pen-
sion based upon the accumulated fund in the individual ac-
count or calculated according to the rules of the vanished pub-
lic system.
III. FINANCING AND TRANSITIONAL COSTS
Financing of pension systems is done not only by payroll
contributions imposed on employers and insured workers but
also by investment yields and state subsidies. Undoubtedly,
workers pay their own contributions, but there is a theoretical
and empirical debate on whether the employer actually pays
his contribution or transfers it either to consumers via prices
or to his or her employees. Such transfers should not have an
impact on employment, although they might have an effect on
income distribution. However, one side in the debate alleges
that, if the employer indeed pays his contribution, it causes a
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
distorted effect on the labor market: an incentive for the em-
ployer to substitute capital for labor with adverse consequences
on employment creation.3
The above argument was used in Chile to eliminate the
employer's contribution in the pension system, and the same
was done in Bolivia and Peru (see Table 2, column 3). This has
not been the case in the other five countries. One slightly re-
duced the employer's contribution (Uruguay), three did not
change it (Argentina, El Salvador, and Mexico), and one actu-
ally increased it (Colombia). Such differences have been the re-
sult of two factors: the constitution that in some countries
establishes the obligation of employers to contribute (hence the
abolition of such contribution would have required a difficult
constitutional amendment) and strong opposition from trade
unions and some political parties.
The insured contribution has not been eliminated in any
country, but it was somewhat reduced in Chile (see Table 2,
column 4). This was possible due to a 1979 reform that tight-
ened and standardized entitlement conditions among numer-
ous pension funds, thus generating significant savings that
were assigned to reduce the insured contribution in the private
system. Such cut was not granted to workers insured in the old
system; hence, it operated as an incentive to move them to the
new private system. Out of the other seven reforms, the in-
sured contribution remained unchanged in Argentina and
Mexico and was increased in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador
(the highest raise), Peru and Uruguay (the smallest).
The above analysis indicates that pension reform is not
cheap and is largely financed by the insured. Three countries
eliminated the employer's contribution, and one reduced the
insured's, while one country raised the employer's, and five
augmented the insured's contribution. In Mexico both the
employer's and insured's contributions were not changed but,
the state payroll contribution (as a third party) was substan-
tially enlarged. The next segment of this section proves that
fiscal subsidies are a major source of reform financing, particu-
larly during the transition period.
3 For further study, see CARMELO MESA-LAGO, CHANGING SOCIAL SECURITY IN
LATIN AMERICA: TowARDs THE ALLEVIATION OF SOCIAL COSTS OF ECONOMIC RE-
FORM 4 (Lynne Rienner ed., 1994).
[Vol. 64: 3
19981 STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA 777
The state shares a good part of reform transitional costs in
three ways: (a) covering the pension deficit of the old system,
(b) financing the transfer of contributions made to the old
system by insured who moved to the new ("recognition bond"),
and (c) paying the difference to guarantee a minimum pension
in the new system to those insured who have not accumulated
a fund large enough to finance such minimum pension. In
addition, the state often provides other guarantees to the in-
sured. Chile is the most generous country in terms of those
state subsidies and guarantees; the remaining seven have
restricted those benefits in order to reduce fiscal costs.
The old public system deficit is most significant in the
substitutive model, particularly if all the insured are mandated
to move or the large majority of the insured shifts. The reason
is that either no insured or a minority of insured remain in the
old system, but all current pensions (as well as those generat-
ed by those covered in the old system who gradually retire)
must be paid by the old system. Such deficit is significantly
reduced in the mixed model because all those insured either
stay in the reformed public pension system or move to the
mixed one and continue contributing to the public system or
component. The deficit is reduced in the parallel model (al-
though less than in the mixed model) because a part of the
insured stays in the public system (the majority in Colombia).
The recognition bond is named differently in the six coun-
tries that award it, and their conditions also diverge (see Table
2, column 6). Neither Mexico nor Uruguay awards it-the for-
mer due to the generous option granted to insured workers to
choose their pensions and the latter because the insured does
not move but stays in the public component of the mixed sys-
tem (Argentina also has a mixed model but the prodigal legis-
lature inappropriately awarded a "compensatory benefit" to
those insured who moved, as well as an "additional benefit" to
those who stayed). In Peru only a tiny fraction of those who
moved to the private system have been credited the recognition
bond. The Chilean conditions for this benefit are clearly the
most generous. Only one year of previous contributions is re-
quired in Chile (and Bolivia) to be entitled to the recognition
bond, but the number of years increases to three to four in
Colombia, El Salvador and Peru, and to thirty in Argentina.
No ceiling is imposed on the recognition bond in Chile and El
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Salvador but such a top is established in the other four coun-
tries. All six countries adjust the recognition bond to inflation,
but Chile on top pays a real annual interest yield of 4 percent
(Colombia 3 percent), while Argentina, El Salvador and Peru
pay nothing.
The state-guaranteed minimum pension is not granted in
Bolivia and is established by law but has neither been regulat-
ed in Peru nor awarded in practice. Argentina and Uruguay
guarantee a basic pension in the public component of the
mixed system. The remaining four countries (Chile, Colombia,
El Salvador and Mexico) grant this benefit to those who moved
to the private system (see Table 2, column 7).
There are three additional state guarantees which are
provided by four countries (see Table 2, column 8); Bolivia, El
Salvador, Mexico and Peru do not offer these. A minimum
investment yield (a capital return rate) is guaranteed by the
state in Chile and Colombia when a pension administrator
fails to meet such minimum and has exhausted all its reserves;
this guarantee is also provided by Argentina and Uruguay but
only for public administrators. In these four countries the state
is also responsible for pensions paid by either an administrator
of pension funds or a commercial insurance company when
they go bankrupt and their insured cannot be transferred to
another administrator/company (in Uruguay this guarantee is
restricted to a publicly-managed pension fund). Finally, there
is an independent, ad hoc superintendency of pension adminis-
trators in Chile and Mexico fully financed by the state. Such
agency also exists in Argentina, Bolivia and Peru but is fi-
nanced by the administrators themselves and in El Salvador
with dual financing. In Colombia and Uruguay another institu-
tion exercises the supervision of the system and no additional
financing is required.
The above analysis demonstrates that the eight Latin
American pension reforms are different, and none of them (in-
cluding Chile's) really led to a fully private pension system
because of their mandatory nature, as well as their triple fiscal
costs, state guarantees, and supervision. Bolivia, El Salvador,
Mexico, and Peru have reduced the triple fiscal costs of the
transition as much as possible, and do not offer additional
state guarantees. However, there is a tradeoff here, which is
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that these four countries equally restrict insured workers'
benefits and rights. Conversely, Chile provides the most gener-
ous fiscal subsidies, state guarantees and supervision but with
very high fiscal costs which are financially unfeasible in most
of the other countries of the region.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE REFORM
Performance of the pension reform in the eight Latin
American countries may be evaluated based on five indicators:
(1) labor force coverage; (2) shifts of insured from the old to the
new system; (3) compliance; (4) competition and cost reduction;
and (5) capital accumulation, yields, and impacts on national
saving and financial markets. Most indicators assess perfor-
mance by comparing assumed and real results; in some of
them it is possible to contrast outcomes under the old and new
systems. Table 3 presents all the data available on the five
selected indicators.4
The analysis of performance is restricted by availability of
data and the time span of the systems operation in the eight
countries. Only three of them publish statistics on a regular
basis (monthly, bimonthly, annually) and covering the most
important indicators: Chile is the best, followed by Argentina,
and Peru a distant third. In the other countries there is either
no data available yet because the system was implemented
recently (Bolivia, El Salvador and Mexico), or statistics are not
regularly published and are difficult to obtain (Colombia and
Uruguay). The Chilean system has been in operation more
than seventeen years, but in El Salvador it started to function
half a year ago.
A. Coverage of the Labor Force
Two crucial questions about any national mandatory pen-
sion system, be it public or private, are: what is the current
coverage of the labor force and, if only a small proportion of it
' For more details on this section, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Comparative Anal-
ysis of Structural Pension Reform in Eight Latin American Countries: Description,
Evaluation and Lessons, in CAPITALIZATION: THE BOLIVIAN MODEL OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORM 381-461 (Margaret H. Peirce ed., 1997).
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is covered, what is the chance to expand such protection?
Structural reforms are expected to improve many aspects of
the old system and, therefore, attract uninsured workers into
the new system. One axiom is that the lower the initial cover-
age, the more difficult it is to expand it by reform.
Before the reforms, there were significant differences in
coverage among the eight countries, which still persist in virtu-
ally all of them (see Table 3, No. 1). The pioneering countries,
which had the oldest schemes and were the most socially de-
veloped (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), had about 80 percent
of their labor force covered. These three countries also had,
and not by chance, the highest percentages of both the salaried
labor force and formal employment, which facilitated the ex-
tension of coverage under a conventional social insurance sys-
tem. We have seen that the latter is financed by payroll con-
tributions from both the insured and the employer as well as
the state as a third party in some countries.
However, in less developed countries, the bulk of the labor
force is not salaried and formal but made up of self-employed,
informal workers, peasants and others who do not have an
employer and, hence, lack the latter's contribution which aver-
ages two-thirds of total contribution revenue in Latin America.
This is the most important explanatory factor behind the low
coverage of most countries in the region, e.g., 12 percent in
Bolivia and 23 percent in El Salvador, the two least developed
among the eight analyzed herein. To become covered, a self-
employed worker normally must pay the sum of the insured's
and employer's percentage contributions on the payroll or
about twice the percentage assigned to a salaried worker. Es-
tablishing the minimum wage as a tax base does not correct
the problem because a large majority of the self-employed has
an income well below such minimum. The heavy financial
burden imposed on the self-employed thus becomes a signifi-
cant barrier for coverage.
In Argentina and Uruguay the self-employed are propor-
tionally small and mandatorily incorporated into the system.
However, in Chile, also with a relatively small number of self-
employed, coverage is voluntary, and only 11 percent of them
are affiliated, mostly professionals with high income. If after
seventeen years of successful operation, the Chilean system
has been unable to solve this problem, it would be impossible
[Vol. 64: 3
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to extend coverage in less developed countries in which the
majority of the labor force is self-employed, informal, peasant
and so forth.
The problem discussed above is exacerbated in those coun-
tries that have significantly increased the insured's contribu-
tion (e.g., five times in El Salvador) because, contrary to the
reformers' claim, evasion and noncompliance will probably rise,
and fewer workers will be covered by the system. In Bolivia,
which has the lowest coverage of the region except for Haiti
and the Dominican Republic, the elimination of the employer's
contribution and the increase in the insured's contribution
(combined with one of the largest informal sectors in the region
and voluntary coverage of the self-employed) will probably also
lead to a decrease in protection.
B. Shift of the Insured from the Old to the New System
If indeed the new system is much better than the old, an
assumption is that most of those currently insured should
shift. Table 3, No. 2 exhibits significant differences among the
eight countries, in terms of the proportion who has actually
moved, ranging from 100 percent in Bolivia and Mexico to 38
percent in Colombia. Three factors may explain those differenc-
es: the time of operation of the new system, its real or per-
ceived virtues (financial soundness, guarantee for delivery of
benefits, success) compared with the old system, and the free-
dom of the insured to move between the two systems. In Boliv-
ia and Mexico the main factor influencing movement is unre-
lated to the virtues of the new system, which only recently
started to function, but simply is that the law closed the old
system and mandated the transfer of all its insured to the new
system. Thus, the insured had no choice to stay and was forced
to move.
In the case of Colombia, nevertheless, the public system
was the subject of a substantial reform which reportedly
strengthened its finances, improved its efficiency and services,
and increased its reserves considerably; hence, the majority of
the insured decided to stay. A second factor may have been the
lack of accurate and easy-to-understand information on the
private system's real investment yields, which made it not very
attractive. The outcome has been facilitated by the freedom
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granted to all the insured to move between the parallel public
and private systems. Whatever the reasons are, after more
than four years following the implementation of the reform,
the majority of insured remains affiliated to the public system.
Among the remaining five countries, the percentage of
those who have moved ranges from 96 percent in Chile, to 75
percent in Argentina and Peru, to 65 percent in Uruguay (hard
data are not available for El Salvador, only projections). The
very high proportion reported by Chile is marred by statistical
deficiencies, e.g., double counting of insured in the private
system, resulting from too many shifts in a short period of
time, which could not be caught fast enough by the accounting
system and the lack of a central clearing house. These prob-
lems surfaced in 1996 when the superintendency published
that 107 percent of the labor force was covered by the new
system; such figure did not take into account that 89 percent of
the self-employed were not covered, a small percentage of in-
sured remained in the old system, and the armed force's cover-
age was not included because they have a separate system. As
a result, the controversial figure has been corrected and total
coverage is now grossly estimated as 80 percent, 90 percent of
which is reported to be in the private system. Still, this per-
centage is high and a current study is under way to accurately
calculate coverage.
C. Compliance
Another assumption of a private pension system is that,
because insured workers own individual accounts which cannot
be diverted for purposes other than the pension (and funds in
the accounts are invested and their returns added to such
accounts), it is in the interest of those insured to pay their con-
tributions on time. As an outcome, compliance should be
strong, thus reducing evasion and payment delays. Yet, data
available for six countries (Table 3, No.3) indicate the opposite.
The percentage of affiliates that are active contributors (pay on
time) averages 54 percent and ranges from 65 to 61 percent in
Mexico and Uruguay to 49 to 45 percent in Argentina and
Peru. Furthermore, in Chile, the proportion of active contribu-
tors over affiliates steadily decreased from 76 percent in 1983
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to 56 percent in June 1998. The proportion in Argentina de-
clined from 53 to 49 percent from January 1996 through Au-
gust 1998 (there are no data on Peruvian trends).
Explanations for the above phenomenon in Chile are mul-
tiple and complex, among them: (a) part of the affiliates has
left the labor force either temporarily or permanently (unem-
ployment is not a cause because it steadily declined from 1986
through 1997); (b) part of the employers delay the transfer of
contributions deducted from their employees; (c) the high num-
ber of insured changes among administrators, combined with
poor accounting, lead to double counting and a higher number
of affiliates than in reality; and (d) low-income insured mini-
mize their contributions just to qualify for a pension and thus
maximize the state subsidy to guarantee them a minimum
pension. No explanations are available from the other coun-
tries.
D. Competition and Cost Reduction
Another fundamental assumption of a private pension
system is that it will be competitive and thus reduce costs,
improve efficiency and maximize investment yields, all benefits
on behalf of the insured. The latter are expected to select the
best administrator among several, but that requires a reason-
able number of them, which in turn is directly related to the
size of the labor force. In Chile, Argentina and Mexico, the
number of those insured ranges from six to eleven million, and
the corresponding number of administrators oscillates from
twelve to seventeen, which means that there are a fair number
of them (see Table 3, No. 4).
Conversely, as the number of insured declines, there is a
decrease in the number of administrators: in Bolivia, there are
356,000 insured and all of them were mandated to move (if
they had the choice of staying, fewer of them would be in the
new system). The government realized that there would not be
enough administrators to promote competition, and decided to
have an international bidding and select only two. All the
insured were divided by the government between the two ad-
ministrators, based on residence, and the insured were prohib-
ited to change until the year 2000 unless they moved to anoth-
er location. The base of the whole private system is competi-
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tion, but it obviously does not function in Bolivia which has a
duopoly or two half monopolies. It has been argued, however,
that the Bolivian system has the advantage of eliminating
marketing costs and salespeople; hence, its administrative
costs are the lowest in Latin America.5 This might be true, but
still there is no freedom of choice in the Bolivian system. Fur-
thermore, one could argue that similar or better results could
have been obtained with either a state monopoly that functions
efficiently or auctioning off a complete monopoly to a large and
efficient private provider.
In order to increase the number of pension fund adminis-
trators, as well as competition, in countries with a small labor
force, a World Bank official has recommended dropping the
requirement that such administrators be private corporations
of exclusive dedication, and allow financial intermediaries to
enter the market.6 For instance, in Chile, a bank may have
shares in a pension fund administrator but both institutions
must be separated, and the bank infrastructure cannot be used
by the administrator. This restriction forces pension adminis-
trators to spend considerable sums in developing an infrastruc-
ture from scratch, which in turn increases costs.
Even in countries where there are a reasonable number of
pension administrators, an important question is whether the
insured really select the best ones, that is, those that pay the
highest real investment yields and charge the lowest commis-
sions. The degree of insured concentration in the eight coun-
tries declines from 100 percent in Bolivia, to between 75 and
73 percent in Peru and Chile, between 68 and 61 percent in
Uruguay and Colombia, 52 percent in Argentina and 43 per-
cent in Mexico (see Table 3, No. 4).
In Chile there was a concentration of 73 percent in June
1998 and that percentage exhibited an increasing trend from
1983 through 1998. The three administrators with the largest
proportion of insured are not, historically, those that have paid
the highest investment yield and charged the lowest commis-
' MONIKA QUEISSER, THE SECOND-GENERATION PENSION REFORMS IN LATIN
AMERICA 131 (1998).
6 Hemant Shah, A Critical Analysis of the Current Designs of Private Pension
Systems in Latin America: Cause of Concern?, in CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
AND PRIVATE PENSION FUND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (Miami: Inst. for Intl
Research, 1997).
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sion. The market, therefore, has not functioned properly due to
two reasons. First, there exists a lack of knowledge or insuffi-
cient information about the performance of the administrators.
Another possibility is that the information is available but the
insured cannot use it due to a lack of skills. Second, the role of
salespersons whose work is to change the insured between
administrators and get a commission paid for each shift may
cause a malfunction within the market. As the salesperson
moves more insured, the higher his or her commission is, but
the salesperson's interest does not necessarily coincide with
the interest of the insured. About half of all active contributors
in Chile changed administrators between 1996 and 1997,
mainly through salespersons, and 40 percent of total costs
went to salespersons and marketing (the number of salesper-
sons multiplied five-fold from 1990 through 1997). In Argenti-
na such changes were 29 percent, and in Peru less than 2
percent due to restrictions to change and incentives to stay.7
The outcome of all this is that administrative costs have
not declined. What has decreased is the premium for disability
and survivor insurance which is managed by commercial insur-
ance companies. In Chile the premium decreased from 1.22 to
0.62 percent from 1990 to 1998, but the commission rose from
1.73 to 2.34 percent from 1990 to 1995 and then declined to 2
percent (still higher than in 1990). Conversely, the commission
for old-age insurance has oscillated but tended to increase in
the long run. The net result has been rising or at best stagnant
administrative costs, a strong indication that competition does
not work properly.
E. Capital Accumulation, Yields, and Impacts on National
Saving and Financial Markets
Virtually all structural pension reforms in Latin America
have been sold on the assumption that they increase national
saving.8 Indeed, capital accumulation has been impressive. In
Chile it reached U.S. $29 billion in June 1998 (down from a
" Jos6 Manuel Quijano, Los Traspasos de Fondos de Pensiones en Amdrica del
Sur, 48 COMERCIO EXTERIOR 761-63 (Mexico City, 1998).
' For a theoretical discussion of the impacts of pensions on saving in OECD
countries, see LAWRENCE H. THOMPSON, OLDER AND WISER: THE ECONOMICS OF
PUBLIC PENSIONS 51-69 (1998).
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peak of U.S. $32.6 billion in September 1997) and 39 percent of
GDP in 1997 (it should be recalled, however, that the Chilean
system has been in operation for more than seventeen years,
hence, the accumulation ought to be higher than in Argentina
and Peru whose systems have functioned only four to five
years). Furthermore, Chilean pension funds have generated a
very high real investment yield-an annual average of 11.2
percent in July 1981 through June 1998. Actually, the average
was higher from 1981 through 1994 (13.8 percent), but it
turned negative in 1995 (-2.5 percent). It increased in 1996 (3.3
percent) and 1997 (4.8 percent) but was well below the histori-
cal average and sharply declined from July 1997 through June
1998 (-5.4 percent) due to the emerging economies crisis in
Asia and Latin America.'
Two other countries have significant capital accumulation,
although lower than Chile: in Argentina (U.S. $9.4 billion and
3 percent of GDP) and in Peru (U.S. $1.8 billion and 2 percent
of GDP). Annual average investment yield in these two coun-
tries has been: in Argentina 15.4 percent from July 1994
through July 1998 (from September 1997 through September
1998, it was -13.1 percent) and in Peru 6.8 percent (from July
1997 through July 1998, it was -0.8 percent).0 The emerging
economies crisis have also affected these two countries in the
last year.
The conclusion often derived from the previous facts (ex-
cluding negative yields in the last year) is that structural pen-
sion reforms have had a significant positive impact on national
saving. This is correct if one only looks to the accumulation in
the private system, but not if the fiscal costs of the transition
are taken into account. In order to know what is the NET im-
pact of the pension reform, therefore, both sides must be
considered.
The only long-run econometric study available on Chile
(commissioned by the International Monetary Fund) states
that the empirical evidence coincides with the assumption that
pension reform has contributed to financial market develop-
' Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, Nos. 1-145
BOLETIN ESTADISTICO (1981-1998).
10 Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, 4 BOLETIN
ESTADISTICO MENSUAL (Oct. 1998); MONTHLY INFO. BULL. (Superintendency of Pri-
vate Pension Funds Administrators), July 31, 1998.
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ment, but cautions: "all this evidence does not establish water-
tight proof that the establishment of pension funds has been
the decisive factor in the impressive development of financial
markets since the mid-1980s," the latter "may simply reflect
changes in legislation and other lessons learned from the expe-
riences and mistakes of the late 1970s and early 1980s." The
study reaches the following stronger conclusions on the impact
on national saving:
contrary to the common belief about the effects of the pension re-
form, the empirical findings suggest that the direct effect on finan-
cial market developments on the private saving rate was nega-
tive .... The data indicates that net pension savings were negative
until 1989 and small afterward. These approaches independently
suggest that the conventionally assumed impact of a Chilean-type
pension reform on private (and national) saving may not hold...
These results also temper the optimism reigning in Latin America
and Eastern Europe, where pension reform is seen as an easy vehi-
cle to boost national saving, and thus capital accumulation and
growth.
1
'
Another study done by a Chilean economist, also for the
first fourteen years of the Chilean pension system, shows that
the net effect on national saving was always negative, that is,
in all years the fiscal cost was higher than the capital accumu-
lation, and the annual average in the period was -2.4 percent
of GDP. 2 At best, one can say that the impact of pension re-
form on national saving, under the longest and most successful
system, has been negative so far. Perhaps it will have a posi-
tive impact when most of the transition is over, but this re-
mains to be proven. It is a disservice to developing countries,
therefore, to recommend pension reform based on the assump-
tion that it will immediately generate a boom in national
saving.
n1 ROBERT HOLZMANN, PENSION REFORM, FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT, AND
ECONoMIc GROWTH: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM CHILE 163, 175 (IMF Staff Pa-
per No. 44, 1997).
12 Alberto Arenas de Mesa, Learning from the Privatization of the Social Secu-
rity Pension System in Chile: Macroeconomic Effects, Lessons and Challenges 1997
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Library).
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F. A Final Point of Debate: Market Freedom Versus State
Regulation
A challenging observation made to the Author at the pre-
sentation of his paper was that some of the performance flaws
pinpointed in this section could be the result not of adminis-
trative flaws but of excessive government restrictions imposed
on the pension system which increase its costs and reduce its
capital returns. The competition introduced in many of the
pension markets in Latin America, continues the argument,
has been regulated or limited significantly, a point illustrated
by the three following examples:
First, in most countries, the law has imposed on pension
administrators the obligation to pay an annual minimum in-
vestment yield to the insured, which results in excessive cau-
tion in avoiding risks because market fluctuations may ad-
versely affect the investment yield in a given year. In turn,
this leads to a "herd mentality" of administrators and fairly
similar portfolios among them, which harm competition and
may adversely affect capital returns. One extreme solution to
cope with that problem is to free administrators from paying
the minimum yield, while a moderate solution is to extend the
base period to calculate such minimum from one to two (or
three) years.
A second example is the legal prohibition or restriction to
invest in foreign instruments, although these could actually
help to diversify the portfolio and increase capital returns,
particularly in countries that have poorly developed financial
markets. For instance, foreign investment is prohibited in El
Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay, or has a ceiling of 5 percent of
the portfolio in Peru and 9 to 10 percent in Argentina, Colom-
bia and Chile, while it is allowed up to 50 percent in Bolivia.
Both El Salvador and Bolivia endure some of the least devel-
oped financial markets in the region, but the law treats foreign
investment in radically opposite ways in these two countries,
mainly as an outcome of political pressures on the legislators.
In the case of Chile, in spite of the 9 percent legally allowed
and a need to diversify the portfolio, only 0.7 percent was actu-
ally invested in foreign instruments by June of 1997, but the
economic and financial crisis led to a sharp decrease in invest-
ment on local stocks and a jump in foreign investment to 5.3
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percent in October 1998. The latter percentage is still well
below the maximum permitted by the law, and such phenome-
non is explained by the obligation to guarantee the minimum
yield.
A third example of potentially adverse regulation is the
method to fix commissions to administer the pension fund:
often they are imposed as a percentage of insured wages and a
ceiling is fixed. This method does not provide incentives to
reduce administrative costs and commissions, and a percentage
on profit has been proposed as an alternative.
The above examples illustrate that the pension market has
been restricted in all eight countries by state intervention and
limitations; furthermore, we have seen that most countries
have a supervisory agency empowered to regulate and control,
while in several of them the state provides some guarantees
(e.g., against bankruptcy, to pay a minimum pension, to pay a
minimum yield). A crucial reason for all these restrictions is
that the market cannot be left to operate completely free be-
cause it could be exposed to very high risks that could harm
the safety of a mandatory national pension program: if a disas-
ter strikes then either the insured and pensioners will be left
unprotected or the state will have to take care of them. There
is a trade off, therefore, between the regulations and restric-
tions imposed on the market, in order to provide minimum
safety in a pension system, and total freedom with high risks
and potential lack of protection. The ultimate trick is to devel-
op a pension system that optimally combines both factors of
that equation.
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